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Abstract: This chapter puts forward a distinctive understanding of the value embodied in the 
Rule of Law. Our view finds its initial inspiration in an empirical study of attitudes towards 
the law that we then seek to support on philosophical grounds. Section 2 is an empirical 
analysis of nationally representative survey data from the US about law-related attitudes and 
legal compliance. Consistent with numerous prior studies, we find that people’s ascriptions of 
legitimacy to the legal system (labelled here ‘legitimacy’) is predicted strongly by people’s 
perceptions of the procedural justice of police and court officials. We also find that two 
factors emerge as significant predictors of people’s self-reported compliance with the law: (i) 
content-independent felt moral duty to obey the law (one constituent component of 
legitimacy); and (ii) people’s moral assessments of the content of specific legal requirements 
(labelled here ‘personal morality’). Crucially, however, we observe an interactive relationship 
between these two factors. At higher levels of personal morality, duty to obey is a better 
predictor of compliance than it otherwise is (and vice-versa, personal morality is a better 
predictor at higher levels of duty to obey). This suggests that the morality ‘baked in’ to 
specific laws interacts with the morality that people ascribe to legal authorities that operate 
under the Rule of Law. In Section 3, we put forward a philosophical counterpart of the above 
interactive phenomenon, with a particular focus on the value of the Rule of Law. We 
advocate a distinctive alternative to two rival paradigms in the jurisprudential discourse—the 
first of which claims that Lon Fuller’s eight precepts of legality embody a moral virtue not 
contingent on the law’s content, while the second contends that Fuller’s precepts are merely 
principles for the efficient execution of law’s substantive goals (whether morally good or 
bad), and thus have no independent moral value. In contrast, on the view put forward here, 
Fuller’s principles possess an expressive-relational quality, but their expressive effect does 
not materialize in isolation from other, contextual factors. In particular, the extent to which it 
materializes is partly sensitive to the moral quality of law’s content. 
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Abstract: This chapter puts forward a distinctive understanding of the value embodied in the 
Rule of Law. Our view finds its initial inspiration in an empirical study of attitudes towards 
the law that we then seek to support on philosophical grounds. Section 2 is an empirical 
analysis of nationally representative survey data from the US about law-related attitudes and 
legal compliance. Consistent with numerous prior studies, we find that people’s ascriptions of 
legitimacy to the legal system (labelled here ‘legitimacy’) is predicted strongly by people’s 
perceptions of the procedural justice of police and court officials and the extent to which 
officials respect the limits of their rightful authority. We also find that two factors emerge as 
significant predictors of people’s self-reported compliance with the law: (i) content-
independent felt moral duty to obey the law (one constituent component of legitimacy); and 
(ii) people’s moral assessments of the content of specific legal requirements (labelled here 
‘personal morality’). Crucially, however, we observe an interactive relationship between 
these two factors. At higher levels of personal morality, duty to obey is a better predictor of 
compliance than it otherwise is (and vice-versa, personal morality is a better predictor at 
higher levels of duty to obey). This suggests that the morality ‘baked in’ to specific laws 
interacts with the morality that people ascribe to legal authorities that act in ways that are 
procedurally just and signal respect for the limits of their authority. In Section 3, we put 
forward a philosophical counterpart of the above interactive phenomenon, with a particular 
focus on the value of the Rule of Law. We advocate a distinctive alternative to two rival 
paradigms in the jurisprudential discourse—the first of which claims that Lon Fuller’s eight 
precepts of legality embody a moral virtue not contingent on the law’s content, while the 
second contends that Fuller’s precepts are merely principles for the efficient execution of 
law’s substantive goals (whether morally good or bad), and thus have no independent moral 
value. In contrast, on the view put forward here, Fuller’s principles possess an expressive-
relational quality, but their expressive effect does not materialize in isolation from other, 
contextual factors. In particular, the extent to which it materializes is partly sensitive to the 
moral quality of law’s content. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Analytical jurisprudence tends to operate with clean and sharp conceptual distinctions: 
content-dependence vs. content-independence, substance vs. form, legitimate vs. illegitimate 
(merely de facto) authority, and so on. This impulse for sharp delineation has important 
benefits, such as promoting precision and clarity, but it also has at least one, less fortunate, 
side-effect. It can, and sometimes does, blind one to certain nuances and complexities of the 
studied human phenomenon that do not readily fall on any one side of the dividing line 
between alternative conceptual categories. 
The empirical input of social sciences is often capable of preventing, or aiding the 
philosopher to correct for, such oversights. The point made here is not merely that an 
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empirical perspective can serve to remind the philosopher that psychological realities—viz. 
the realities of our attitudes, motivations, and deliberation vis-à-vis the law—are not nearly as 
‘tidy’ as the conceptual systems prevailing analytical jurisprudence, but rather also that 
empirical findings can draw the philosopher’s attention to what are, even from the 
perspective of his or her own discipline, interesting interrelations between the sharply 
delineated conceptual categories predominating her field of inquiry. It is in this way that 
empirical inquiry informs philosophical analysis in the present chapter as regards the moral 
value of the Rule of Law.   
Prior to substantive discussion, an additional comment is worth making regarding the 
link between empirical and philosophical inquiries. Empirical research can inform a 
philosophical discussion in various ways, some of which are straightforward (e.g. the 
verification of factual assumptions, such as assumptions about the human condition or about 
what people are like, which form part of a chain of moral reasoning),1 whereas others are 
more contested or might even be accused of making an unwarranted leap from descriptive 
arguments to evaluative conclusions. The latter accusation is often unjustified since theorists 
working in the interface between empirical and philosophical inquiries normally do not 
suggest ‘that we read morality directly off survey results’ (to use the words of Alfano, Loeb 
& Plakias (2018) in a rejoinder to a similar objection). Rather, work done in this vein 
normally draws on empirical resources in more subtle and qualified ways. More particularly, 
our own way of proceeding here is not susceptible to the above charge, because we do not 
treat empirical findings as the proof of a morally evaluative conclusion, but rather as a source 
of information that, by highlighting certain features of the attitudinal landscape, which may 
(but need not) have moral-philosophical counterparts, draws the philosopher’s attention to 
certain moral possibilities—possibilities that, in turn, ought to be borne out independently by 
recourse to morally evaluative arguments. To employ once more the words of Alfano, Loeb 
& Plakias (2018), ‘[i]magination needs material to work with’; and, insofar as the material, or 
some aspect of it, is not readily visible from the philosopher’s armchair, it is hard see why he 
or she should resist the aid of empirical research, so long as it is used in the qualified manner 
described above. 
Turning to the substance of this chapter, the analysis below falls into two main parts: 
Section 2 consists of an empirical discussion, with a focus on survey data from the US about 
law-related attitudes and predictors of legal compliance. This empirical perspective inspires, 
in Section 3, a fresh engagement with one of the key contested questions in modern 
jurisprudence—namely, the question of value in the Rule of Law—whereby we propose to 
integrate procedural justice and moral content into a hybrid conception of the value of the 
Rule of Law. 
 
2. An Empirical Perspective on Law-Related Attitudes: Procedural Justice, Moral 
Content, and their Mutual Relation  
In this empirical part of the chapter, we analyse nationally representative US survey data 
about law-related attitudes and legal compliance. The current section begins with a brief 
overview of the goals, before then theoretically motivating the two parts of analysis: (1) the 
predictors of police legitimacy and legal legitimacy; and (2) the predictors of offending 
behavior. After the measures and results, this section finishes with a brief summary, linking 
the findings to the current philosophical analysis of the Rule of Law.  
 
Brief overview 
                                                        
1 As can be seen, e.g., in Gur (2018: 110-131; see also ibid., 181-192). 
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Our focus here is on people’s ascriptions of legitimacy to the legal system (labelled here 
‘legitimacy’). We follow a relatively common approach in the social sciences, which is to 
operationalize legitimacy as two connected judgements (Tyler, 2006; Huq et al., 2017; 
Trinkner et al., 2018; for a review of the international literature see Jackson, 2018). The first 
is the right to power—this is measured by asking people about the normative appropriateness 
of a legal institution, with positive answers taken to mean normative justification of power in 
the public eye. The second is the authority to govern—this is measured by asking whether a 
legal authority is entitled to dictate appropriate behavior, so they feel an obligation to defer 
and obey.  
First, we examine the extent to which police legitimacy and legal legitimacy 
(capturing appropriateness and entitlement in each case) are predicted by people’s 
perceptions of how police and court officials behave. Following prior work, and given the 
philosophical focus of the current chapter, we focus on procedural justice (fair interpersonal 
treatment, neutral and accountable decision-making, respecting the rights of citizens, etc) and 
restraint in the application of (rightful) authority (which covers lawfulness but also extends 
beyond it, see Huq et al., 2017; Trinkner et al., 2018). Key here is the distinction between 
legitimacy (being seen to have the right to power and authority to govern) and legitimation 
(being seen to act in legitimate ways, i.e. in ways that legitimate the institution in the eyes of 
citizens). We examine the extent to which people’s perceptions of procedural justice and 
lawfulness/restrained use of authority (in terms of the police and the courts) explain variation 
in both police and legal legitimacy (left-hand side of Figure 1). If they do, then we take this to 
mean that procedural justice and not stepping beyond the limits of their rightful authority are 
two key ways in which the police legitimate themselves in the eyes of those they protect and 
regulate. 
  
Figure 1. Overview of the theoretical model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, we assess whether legal legitimacy predicts legal compliance (right-hand side 
of Figure 1). In particular, we assess whether the following two factors are significant 
predictors of people’s self-reported compliance with the law: (i) content-independent duty to 
obey the law (the second constituent component of legal legitimacy) and (ii) people’s moral 
assessments of the content of specific legal requirements (labelled here ‘moral contents of 
laws’). We also test an interactive relationship between these two factors: we estimate 
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whether a content-independent duty to obey the law has a kind of multiplier effect on the 
motivational force of the content-dependent belief that specific laws are morally justifiable, 
and vice versa, creating a stronger motive to comply with the law.  
 
Legitimation: the sources of police and legal legitimacy 
When studying legitimacy, researchers typically (a) operationalise legitimacy as a 
psychological construct that covers appropriateness and entitlement, (b) treat the 
appropriateness part of the legitimacy construct as an overarching judgment of whether 
authority is exercised appropriately (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Jackson et al., 2013; Tyler & 
Jackson, 2014)., and (c) allow the criteria that people use to judge appropriateness (i.e. 
type(s) of police conduct that shape people’s legitimacy beliefs) to be an empirical question 
(for discussion, see Jackson & Bradford, 2019, and Trinkner, 2019). To avoid imposing the 
specific criteria that people use to judge appropriate police conduct—i.e. to allow those 
criteria to be an open and empirical question—measures of appropriateness are worded in 
generally ways, like ‘the police usually act in ways that are consistent with your sense of 
right and wrong’ and ‘the police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do’. 
Statistical analysis is then used to assess the sources of legitimacy. Is effectiveness a key 
legitimating quality? What about lawfulness and respecting the limits of one’s rightful 
authority? The allocation of fair outcomes across diverse social groups (distributive justice)? 
The application of fair process (procedural justice)? 
We build in this chapter on Trinkner et al.’s (2018) study, which found that police 
legitimacy was strongly correlated with public perceptions of appropriate police behavior. 
Appropriate police behavior was operationalized as a formative construct based on people’s 
beliefs about whether officers act fairly with respect to interpersonal treatment (do officers 
treat citizens with dignity and respect?), decision-making (do officers make unbiased 
decisions?) and restrained authority (do officers respect the limits of their rightful authority?). 
Perceptions of appropriate police behavior predicted police legitimacy, and police legitimacy 
predicted legal legitimacy. Trinkner and colleagues concluded from this that the police are 
tangible representations of the law, and that interactions with the police provide not only 
information about their authority, but also information about the law and government more 
generally (Meares, 2009; Tyler et al., 2014). On this account, the legitimacy of the law is not 
a given power—it is shaped through day-to-day encounters with its agents that serve an 
educative function in that they facilitate the internalization of values from which the law 
gains its legitimacy (Justice & Meares, 2014; Trinkner & Tyler, 2016). 
Following this line of research, but expanding it to include not only police behavior 
but also the behavior of court officials, we assess the extent to which people’s perceptions of 
the procedural justice and lawfulness/respect for the limits of their rightful authority explains 
variation in police and legal legitimacy. Research participants were asked whether they 
thought that police and court officials treat people with dignity and respect, respect people’s 
rights, try to do the best for the community, make decisions based upon the law, explain their 
decisions and actions, give people a chance to tell their side of the story, and make fair and 
impartial decisions. If people believe that legal officials and police act in ways that accord 
with principles of restraint and fair process, do they also tend to feel a duty to obey the law 
whatever its content? If so, obligation to obey the law (because it’s the law) could be seen as 
the acceptance of the content-independent morality of the law that is to some degree shaped 
by the positive recognition that legal officials also ‘play by the rules.’ 
Fuller’s procedural requirements for the Rule of Law are concerned with the 
following formal features of the law itself: generality, promulgation, non-retroactivity, 
clarity, lack of contradictions, not requiring the impossible, constancy through time, and 
congruence between official action and declared rules. Our analysis focuses, by contrast, on 
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what US citizens think about how police and court officials apply the law and exercise their 
authority. We reason that people’s perception of the procedural justice and lawfulness/respect 
for the limits of their rightful authority might be seen as a psychological counterpoint to 
Fuller’s conception of the Rule of Law, at least with respect to their application of the law by 
front-line officials. We focus on procedural justice, which means respecting people’s rights, 
treating people with dignity and respect, making fair and impartial decisions that are based on 
the law not personal bias, making decisions that are good for everyone in the community, 
allowing people a chance to tell their side of the story, and explaining decisions and acting in 
ways that people can understand. We also focus on restraint in the application of authority, 
which means not being unduly influenced by pressure from political parties and politicians, 
not taking bribes, not arresting people and putting them in jail for no reason, and not 
protecting the interests of the rich and powerful above those of ordinary people. We reason 
that the average US citizen may not know whether the law is, for instance, non-retroactive, 
constant over time, not contradictory, and clear. But they hold attitudes towards how police 
and court officials believe, based on their own direct and indirect experience, media coverage 
and so forth.  
 
Offending behavior: Why do people obey the law? 
In The Force of Law, Schauer (2015) makes a distinction between acting consistently with 
the law and obeying the law. Acting consistently with the law means that one would behave 
in the way irrespective of whether it is against the law or not. Consider the frequency with 
which you may or may not steal things. Every time you do not steal something because (a) 
you think stealing is wrong and/or (b) you think others will disapprove and/or (c) you are not 
in the habit of stealing, you are engaging in law-consistent rather than law-abiding behaviour. 
According to Schauer (2015: 6) you are conforming with the law for reasons independent of 
the law—you would be “…engaging in the same behavior [you] would have engaged in even 
if no laws regulating it existed”. By contrast, obeying the law means bringing in the fact that 
something is illegal. Fear of getting caught is one example, legitimacy is another. The 
entitlement part of legitimacy means treating an order or rule as replacing one’s judgement. 
Duty to obey involves internalizing a content-independent obligation to obey the law through 
the associate obligations, positional duties and affective bonds that legitimate power 
structures generate and maintain (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). By providing a motive to obey the 
law, legitimacy forms a content-independent part of normative considerations about the 
‘rights and wrongs’ of non-compliance (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Posch et al., 2019).  
The standard approach to empirically isolate the law-abiding—and content-
independent—motivational force of legal legitimacy is to control in one’s statistical modeling 
for the perceived morality of the criminal acts, fear of sanction and the appropriateness 
component of legal legitimacy. In the study that we build on in the current chapter, Trinkner 
et al. (2018) operationalized the appropriateness part of legal legitimacy as normative 
alignment with the law. This is the belief that the laws that are generally enforced in one’s 
community align with one’s sense of right and wrong and, moreover, that members of one’s 
community should obey the law because this helps maintain a mutually beneficial scheme of 
social cooperation. Entitlement was captured via the notion of duty to obey, i.e. the extent to 
which one internalizes the content-independent moral value that one should obey the law 
even (perhaps especially) if one disagrees with it (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Tyler & Jackson, 
2013, 2014).  
Trinkner et al. (2018) found that duty to obey was a significant negative predictor of 
past criminal behaviour (e.g. buying something that might be stolen, taking something from a 
store without paying for it, and illegally disposing of rubbish or litter), adjusting for 
normative alignment with the law, judgements about the risk of sanction, and the perceived 
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morality of buying stolen goods, shoplifting and dumping rubbish (see also evidence on tax 
compliance from Murphy et al.’s, 2016, Australian-based study). In addition, legal legitimacy 
was linked back to police legitimacy, in that (a) normative alignment with the police was a 
relatively strong positive predictor of normative alignment with the law, and (b) obligation to 
obey the police was a positive predictor of obligation to obey the law. If we go with 
Schauer’s (2015) distinction, people seem to act in lawful ways for one reason to act 
consistently with the law (people agree with the moral content of laws banning stealing, 
dumping rubbish, etc) and one reason to obey the law (people have internalized the 
overarching moral value that one owes it to others in one’s community and to society as a 
whole to avoid breaking the law). Note that Trinkner et al. (2018) found that obligation to 
obey the law predicted legal compliance, adjusting for normative alignment with the law (the 
belief that laws are generally consistent with one’s own sense of right and wrong). This 
strengthens the conclusion that what is being capture in the partial association between 
obligation and compliance really does represent a content-independent motivational force. 
We ask whether the content-dependent values embedded in perceived morality (a 
reason to act consistently with the law) seem to strengthen the link between legal compliance 
and the content-independent value embedded in obligation to obey (a reason to obey the law). 
Building on Trinkner et al.’s (2018) analysis of their US dataset, we test the novel hypothesis 
that duty to obey the law and personal morality are not only negative additive predictors of 
offending behaviour (as was found by Trinkner and colleagues) but also negative interactive 
predictors of offending behaviour. [Denise says: ‘Doesn't thinking that stealing is wrong also 
provide a motive to obey the law?’ If we go with Schauer’s (2015) distinction, then we are 
saying that reasons to act in law-consistent ways are interacting with reasons to act in law-
abiding behaviour ways… flesh this out a little bit]  
The five criminal acts addressed in the US study were making an exaggerated or false 
insurance claim, buying something suspected to be stolen, illegally disposing of rubbish or 
litter, and/or taking something from a store without paying for it. Let us say that: 
 
A: is the value-based motivation to act/not act in a particular illegal way (here, five different 
ways); 
B: is the moral quality one attaches to the particular act; and, 
C: is the moral quality one attaches to abiding by/breaking the law. 
 
An additive relationship means B+C=A, whereby the moral quality someone attaches to, say, 
stealing (B) adds to the moral quality someone attaches to breaking the law (C) to form the 
overall value-based motivation to steal/not steal (B+C=A). An interaction relationship means 
B*C=A, whereby C also enhances the motivational force of B, and B also enhances the 
motivational force of C.  
Why do we suggest this? We assume that when legitimacy is in play, people willingly 
participate in the cooperation scheme that the legal system establishes out of a sense of duty 
rooted in the reciprocal nature of relationships and expectations that people have of each 
other and of legal officials. Building on this premise, duty to obey the law can be represented 
as a horizontally binding quality (in the sense that it connects to other citizens via reciprocal 
duty to obey the law) and a vertically connecting quality (in the sense that it connects to the 
demands that external authority makes on an individual), whereby breaking the law threatens 
the fair and mutually beneficial scheme of social cooperation that the law helps to create and 
maintain. 
Crucially for the current discussion we contend that the belief that one should obey 
the law—because one owes it to society and one owes it to others in one’s community—
heightens the motivational force of the perceived immorality of a particular action. If one 
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feels it is wrong to break the law, then the extent to which one thinks stealing is wrong will 
have a stronger influence on one’s propensity to steal, compared to those who do not feel it is 
necessarily wrong to break the law. This, we propose, is because the morality attached to the 
idea that one owes it to society (vertically binding) and one owes it to others in one’s 
community (horizontally binding) to abide by the law (abstract content-independence) 
strengthens the motivational force of believing that stealing is wrong (concrete content-
dependence). In other words: 
 
• the broader sense that it is wrong to erode the vertically-binding and horizontally-
binding qualities that comes from a collective commitment to law-abidingness (C) 
combines with the narrower sense that it is wrong to steal (B) to create a stronger 
motivational force than would otherwise exist (A); and, 
• the motivational force of the specific moral content of law (stealing is wrong so it is 
right that stealing is illegal) is strengthened by the recognition that the law has the 
right to dictate appropriate behavior, in part because of its vertically- and 
horizontally-binding qualities. 
 
Statistical interactions are symmetrical, so the perceived immorality of a given illegal act 
lends additional motivational force (in terms of refraining from a particular illegal act) to the 
content-independent belief that one should obey the law. Again, the idea is that when it 
comes to whether someone has committed these five different crimes, the belief it is wrong to 
act in these particular ways adds extra motivational force to the belief that it is wrong to 
break the law.  
 
Method 
Sample 
A total of 2,561 respondents were initially selected from a GFK Knowledge Networks 
research panel. The study was described to each individual, an offer of compensation 
extended, and a reminder email was sent to all people on the list who had not responded after 
three days. A total of 1,603 individuals completed the survey, representing a response rate of 
62.5%. The survey was fielded in August and September of 2012 in English or Spanish.   
 
Measures  
We mostly follow Trinkner et al.’s (2018) approach to conceptualization and measurement so 
we direct the reader to that paper for details. We only indicate below what is different. All 
attitudinal measures used a five-point response scale, with higher scores indicating a more 
positive amount of the measured construct.  
Duty to obey the law. The following measures try to capture the extent to which 
people view the law as psychologically binding in their everyday lives:  
 
• Some laws are made to be broken (reversed); 
• Sometimes doing the right thing means breaking the law (reversed);  
• There are times when it is ok to ignore the law (reversed). 
• People should do what the law says; 
• A person who disobeys laws is a danger to others in the community; and, 
• Obeying the law ultimately benefits everyone in the community. 
 
The last three items were treated in Trinkner et al. (2018) as measures of normative alignment 
(alongside the ones detailed below). In a departure we treat them as measures of duty to obey 
(we come back to this in the discussion part of section 2). This reflects the current conceptual 
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claim that duty to obey is not only vertically binding (the first three items reflect the idea that 
one is accepting the right of legal authorities to dictate appropriate behaviour) but also 
horizontally binding (the last three items reflect the sense that people owe it to each other to 
obey the law). The component scores from a principal components analysis of these six items 
were saved for subsequent analysis.  
Normative alignment with the law. Normative alignment with the law was 
measured using the following indicators:  
 
• Your own feelings about what is right and wrong usually agree with the laws that are 
enforced by the police and the courts; 
• The laws in your community are consistent with your own intuitions about what is 
right and just; 
• The laws of our criminal justice system are generally consistent with the views of the 
people in our community about what is right and wrong; 
 
By shifting the above three measures (“people should do what the law says”, “a person who 
disobeys laws is a danger to others in the community”, and “obeying the law ultimately 
benefits everyone in the community”) from normative alignment to duty to obey (compared 
to Trinkner and colleagues’ formulation) we narrow the meaning of normative alignment 
with the law to focus on general value alignment. The component scores from a principal 
components analysis of these three items were saved for subsequent analysis. 
 Police and court procedural justice. Procedural justice is a psychological 
construct—in the current study it is the subjective attitude towards the trustworthiness of 
officials to act in procedurally just ways. Procedural justice of the police and courts reference, 
on the one hand, whether officials exercise their authority in ways that communicate respect, 
dignity and trustworthy motives and respect people’s rights, and on the hand, whether 
officials make decisions in fair and impartial ways, that are based upon the law not biases, 
that are made for the good of everyone in the community, where people are given the chance 
to tell their side of the story (Tyler, 2006a). Respondents were asked a series of questions 
tapping into interpersonal treatment and decision-making with regard to the police and courts. 
The measures of police interpersonal treatment were:  
 
• ‘How often do the police treat people with dignity and respect?’;  
• ‘How often do the police respect people’s rights?’; and,  
• ‘How often do the police try to do what is best for the people they are dealing with?’.  
 
The measures of police decision-making were:  
 
• ‘How often do the police make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal 
with?’; 
• ‘How often do the police give people a chance to tell their side of the story before 
they decide what to do?’; 
• ‘How often do the police make decisions based upon the law and not their personal 
opinions or biases?’;  
• ‘How often do the police make decisions that are good for everyone in the 
community?’; 
• ‘How much control do people have over what happens when they deal with the 
police?’; and, 
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• ‘How often do the police explain their decisions and actions in ways that people can 
understand?’.   
 
The component scores from a principal components analysis of these nine items were saved 
for subsequent analysis. The measures of court interpersonal treatment (cf Tyler & Sevier, 
2015) were:  
 
• ‘How often do they treat the people in your community with dignity and respect?’; 
• ‘How often do they respect people’s rights?’; and,  
• ‘How often do they try to do what is best for the people they are dealing with?’.  
 
The measures of court decision-making were:  
• ‘How often do the courts make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal 
with?’;  
• ‘How often do they give people a chance to tell their side of the story before they 
decide what to do?’; 
• ‘How often do they make decisions based upon the law and not their personal 
opinions or biases?’;  
• ‘How often do they make decisions that are good for everyone in the community?’; 
and, 
• ‘How often do the courts explain their decisions and actions in ways that people can 
understand?’.  
 
The component scores from a principal components analysis of these eight items were saved 
for subsequent analysis. 
 [add lawfulness] 
 
Results 
Relationships among the primary variables of interest are presented in Figure 1.2 Starting 
from the left-hand side, perceptions of police procedural justice and perceptions of court 
procedural justice explain a significant amount of variation in both normative alignment and 
felt duty to obey the police. Police and court procedural justice explains 52% of the variance 
in normative alignment, with police procedural justice unsurprisingly being the strongest 
predictor (b=.24, p<.001, compared to b=.06, p<.001). When US citizens believe that the 
police and courts are fair in their personal interactions with citizens and fair in their decision-
making, they are more likely to believe that officers act in normatively appropriate ways, 
ascribing legitimacy to the institution that officers embody. Additionally, 21% of the variance 
of duty to obey is explained by perceptions of police procedural justice (b=.13, p<.001) and 
perceptions of court procedural justice (b=.05, p<.01).  
Turning to legal legitimacy, normative alignment with the law (45% of explained 
variance) was predicted by normative alignment with the police (b=.48, p<.001) and 
perceived court procedural justice (b=.08, p<.001). Thus, the more US citizens believed that 
officers had an appropriate sense of right and wrong, the more likely they were to think that 
the law was also morally appropriate. Of the variance in felt duty to obey the law, 25% was 
explained. The main predictor was normative alignment with the police (b=.22, p<.001).  
                                                        
2 Like Trinkner et al. (2018) we use MPlus to fit a path analysis model (using full information maximum 
likelihood to deal with missing values) and treat the constructs as formative, in the sense that the measures 
constitute the construct. Components scores from principal components analysis for the separate indices were 
saved using Stata and imported to MPlus.  
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Offending behaviour was strongly and negatively associated with the perceived 
morality of the acts measured in the compliance index (b=-3.11, p<.001), duty to obey the 
law was also a negative predictor (b=-.53, p<.05) and the interaction between perceived 
morality and obligation to obey was negative (b=-1.18, p<.05). The range of the perceived 
morality index was just over 1 (starting at 0.4) and the range of the obligation to obey was 
just below 5 (starting just below -2.5). The parameter estimates indicate that the stronger the 
felt obligation to obey, the stronger the negative statistical association between perceived 
morality and legal compliance. Interactions are symmetrical, so the stronger the perceived 
morality, the stronger the negative statistical association between felt obligation to obey and 
legal compliance. 
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Figure 2. A model of procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal legitimacy and legal compliance, with obligation to obey the law and personal 
morality interaction. Structural equation modelling, predicting a count of self-reported offending behaviour using negative binomial regression 
[unstandardized coefficients] 
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Note: pairs of variables without directed arrows were allowed to correlate. For instance: r=.398*** normative alignment with the law & 
obligation to obey the law; r=.350*** normative alignment with the police & obligation to obey the police;  r=.254*** personal morality & 
obligation to obey the law; and r=.143*** personal morality & normative alignment with the law 
 
 
 
MODEL RESULTS 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 CRIME_COUN ON 
    LIKELY            -0.206      0.125     -1.654      0.098 
    MORAL_COUN        -0.275      0.066     -4.160      0.000 
    LAW_NA            -0.093      0.127     -0.730      0.466 
14 
 
    NEW_OBEY           0.026      0.184      0.142      0.887 
    OBEY_INTER        -0.160      0.069     -2.315      0.021 
    DISAPPROVA         0.055      0.106      0.517      0.605 
 
new_obey 
moral_count -2 -1 0 1 2
0 0.47711 0.69073 1 1.44773 2.09594
2 0.46024 0.52309 0.59452 0.6757 0.76797
4 0.44397 0.39614 0.35345 0.31537 0.28139
6 0.42827 0.29999 0.21014 0.14719 0.10311
8 0.41313 0.22718 0.12493 0.0687 0.03778
10 0.39852 0.17204 0.07427 0.03206 0.01384
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.  nbreg crime_count_not_traffic likely moral_count_snipped2   law_na new_obey obey_inter_moral_count2 disapproval 
 
Fitting Poisson model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1386.0152   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1366.6468   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1366.4995   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1366.4994   
 
Fitting constant-only model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1265.9377   
0
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Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1224.9833   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1108.7455   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1081.5159   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1081.2417   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1081.2417   
 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1037.9574   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1033.8768   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1018.3436   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =    -1018.1   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1018.0996   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1018.0996   
 
Negative binomial regression                    Number of obs     =      1,395 
                                                LR chi2(6)        =     126.28 
Dispersion     = mean                           Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1018.0996                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0584 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crime_count_not_traffic |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 likely |  -.2002564   .0954946    -2.10   0.036    -.3874224   -.0130905 
   moral_count_snipped2 |  -.2770377   .0394726    -7.02   0.000    -.3544027   -.1996728 
                 law_na |  -.0587909   .0974139    -0.60   0.546    -.2497186    .1321369 
               new_obey |   .3360529   .2602571     1.29   0.197    -.1740417    .8461475 
obey_inter_moral_count2 |  -.1096641   .0340475    -3.22   0.001    -.1763961   -.0429322 
            disapproval |  -.0226828   .0818899    -0.28   0.782     -.183184    .1378184 
                  _cons |   .8963179   .2903097     3.09   0.002     .3273213    1.465315 
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
               /lnalpha |    1.56718   .1070307                      1.357403    1.776956 
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  alpha |   4.793111   .5130101                      3.886089    5.911834 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 696.80               Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000
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Discussion 
Before we turn back to philosophical matters, there are three issues worth considering: 
 
1. The role of procedural justice;  
2. The slight reformulation of the duty to obey part of the legal legitimacy 
construct; and, 
3. The interactive relationship between content-dependent values and content-
independent duty to obey when explaining variation in legal compliance. 
 
We take each in turn. 
 First, our analysis supports the idea that police and legal legitimacy are to some 
degree grounded in public attitudes towards the procedural justice of police and courts 
in the US, albeit we cannot rule out the idea that the arrow of causality goes the other 
direction (cf. Nagin & Telep, 2017; Trinkner et al., 2019; Jackson & Posch, 2019). 
Second, we ‘tweaked’ the duty to obey construct to include not only sentiments like 
‘some laws are made to be broken’ but also ‘obeying the law ultimately benefits 
everyone in the community’. This shifted duty to obey to reflect a vertically binding 
quality (in that someone who thinks that laws are not made to be broken is accepting the 
right of institutions to expect citizens to obey the law simply because it’s the law) and a 
horizontally binding quality (in that someone who thinks that obeying the law 
ultimately benefits everyone in the community believes that one owes it not just to 
institutions but also each other to obey the law to help everyone get along).  
 Third, prior work has found additive effects of personal morality and legitimacy 
on legal compliance (Tyler, 2006a; Jackson et al., 2012; Trinkner et al., 2018). Personal 
morality is typically the strongest predictor, whereby people who think stealing is 
wrong (for example) also tend not to steal, however legitimacy was a positive predictor 
of compliance, adjusting for personal morality. We found a positive statistical 
interaction between content-dependent values (personal morality) and content-
independent duty to obey, which suggests that the moral quality attached to the 
horizontally and vertically binding qualities of duty to obey strengthens the 
motivational kick that content-dependent values has on people’s behaviour. To believe 
that stealing is wrong helps one to refrain from stealing because we are motivated to act 
according to our own particular sense of right and wrong. But people know that stealing 
is illegal, and to assign a particular immoral charge to breaking the law (because it’s the 
law) may be to augment the sense of immorality of the act with a sense that breaking the 
law threatens the vertically and horizontally binding qualities that the law represents in 
people’s lives: 
 
• one adds to (a) the belief that stealing is inherently wrong, (b) the sense that to 
steal is to break the law and to break the law is wrong because it harms the 
bonds that one feels to others and to society through the collective commitment 
to the rule of law (additive effects); but, 
• but the second also strengthens the motivational force of the first (and vice 
versa) because content-independent connections strengthen one’s commitment 
to refrain from acts that one views as inherently wrong (when those acts have 
been designated as illegal) - and vice versa (interactive effect). 
 
More broadly, the morality ‘baked in’ to specific laws interacts with the legitimacy that 
people ascribe to legal authorities that they believe operate under the Rule of Law. 
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3. A Philosophical Perspective: Procedure-Content Interaction in the Value of the 
Rule of Law 
In this Section, we propose and advocate a philosophical counterpart of the above-
observed interactive phenomenon, with a particular focus on the value of the Rule of 
Law. Before presenting our view, some comments are required on our conception of the 
Rule of Law, and on the principal controversy surrounding its value. 
Firstly, what conception of the Rule of Law are we assuming for purposes of 
this analysis? In particular, are we assuming a formal (or, procedural) conception of the 
Rule of Law, such as Dicey’s (1885),3 Fuller’s (1969), and Raz’s (2009: 210-218), 
according to which Rule-of-Law requirements pertain only to formal or procedural 
features of law (e.g. generality, clarity, and prospectively of legal norms; a hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal as a condition to the imposition of legal sanction, 
or the like)? Or, are we proceeding on a conception such as Bingham’s (2010: 67), 
Chaskalson’s (quoted in Agrast, Botero, & Ponce A., 2011: 9), and Dworkin’s (1985: 
11-12),4 which includes also a substantive component in the Rule of Law, requiring that 
the content of legal norms conforms to certain standards or values (fundamental human 
rights, social justice, or the like)? The conception assumed by our analysis is the formal 
(or, procedural) conception of the Rule of Law. We adopt such a conception for the 
following reasons. First, we find merit in some of the objections voiced in the literature 
against the inclusion of substantive elements in the Rule of Law—for example, the 
worry that so doing would render the notion’s meaning too open to controversies 
between differing political and ideological persuasions, thereby eroding the notion’s 
distinctive useful function in theoretical and practical discourse.5 Second, a framework 
of analysis that lumps form and substance together in one conceptual category, in the 
way substantive conceptions of the Rule of Law do, is not likely to best facilitate our 
primary purpose here, which is to draw attention to a certain relation between form and 
substance; such a framework of analysis might, even if inadvertently, obscure the 
distinction between form and substance, and, to this extent, might also make it difficult 
to gain a precise view of their interrelations. Thus, proceeding on a formal conception 
of the Rule of Law is likely to be more auspicious to our theoretical purpose. Third, past 
jurisprudential debate on the moral status of the Rule of Law, as shaped by dominant 
contributors such as Fuller, Hart, Raz, Simmonds, and Kramer, has tended to revolve 
around a formal conception of the Rule of Law,6 and, by way of engaging with past 
discourse, it would be sensible for us to do the same. 
The central contested question among jurisprudential writers on the Rule of Law 
can be couched as follows. Do the Rule-of-Law precepts—e.g. generality, clarity, 
publicity, and prospectivity of legal norms, and congruence between the norms as 
announced and their actual administration—constitute or serve any moral value (or, 
                                                        
3 See also analysis in Craig (1997: 470-474).  
4 See also analysis in Craig (1997: 477-479). 
5 A concern expressed by Raz (2009: 211): ‘If the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain 
its nature is to propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the term lacks any useful function’; and 
by Waldron (2016: sec 5.3): ‘Once we open up the possibility of the Rule of Law’s having a substantive 
dimension, we inaugurate a sort of competition in which everyone clamors to have their favorite political 
ideal incorporated as a substantive dimension of the Rule of Law. … The result is likely to be a general 
decline in political articulacy, as people struggle to use the same term to express disparate ideals.’ 
6 Indeed, a substantive conception obviates the question. 
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moral virtue, moral ideal, or the like)?7 The literature on this question contains a diverse 
range of approaches, but it would be helpful, for present purposes, to single out for 
consideration two principal paradigms that have dominated the debate. 
 
3.1. Two Conflicting Paradigms on the Moral Status of the Rule of Law 
According to the first paradigm, the Rule-of-Law principles embody a moral virtue not 
contingent on the law’s content. The second paradigm is an antithesis that views the 
Rule of Law precepts merely as principles for the efficient execution of law’s 
substantive goals (whether morally good or bad), principles that hold no independent 
moral value.  
The first view is most notably associated with Lon Fuller (1969). Fuller, to 
begin with, approaches his inquiry about law through what might be called a purposive 
framework of analysis: on this approach, law can be best understood by reflection on its 
purpose—and, in particular, on the ways it can fail to achieve its purpose and the 
conditions it must meet in order to achieve its purpose. He highlights, through an 
amusing allegory featuring an imaginary monarch called Rex, eight types of failure to 
craft law in a form fit for its purpose (ibid., 33-38). From these eight types of failure, he 
derives eight requirements of legal form: generality; promulgation; non-retroactivity; 
clarity; non-contradiction; not requiring the impossible; constancy through time; and 
congruence between official action and declared rules.  High level of compliance with 
these eight precepts represents a form of excellence in the ‘craftsmanship’ of law, 
whereas, at the lower of end of this scale of attainment, a total failure to comply with 
any one of those precepts results in something that is not a legal system properly so 
called (ibid., 39)8—in this sense, these precepts are a constitutive element of law.9 Most 
crucially for our purpose, Fuller maintains that those eight formal requirements embody 
and promote certain moral values—they represent, in his terminology, ‘the inner’ or 
‘the internal’ morality of law (ibid., passim; inner or internal because they are integral 
to the nature of law). He distinguishes this formal or procedural moral aspect from what 
he calls ‘the external morality’ of law (ibid., 47, 96), namely substantive standards of 
moral behaviour that the law may (or may not) adopt into the content of its rules of 
conduct. And, in a similar vein, he sometimes describes his eight formal requirements 
as a ‘procedural version of natural law’ (ibid., 96-97). Drawing on this terminology, we 
will refer to Fuller’s approach by the label ‘the procedural morality conception’. 
Now, what moral values exactly does Fuller associate with the eight Rule-of-
Law principles? We can conveniently divide his comments in this regard into comments 
about direct and about indirect relations to value. Starting from direct relations, he 
notes, for example, that the last of the eight precepts (i.e. congruence) represents an 
aspect of reciprocity in the relation between government and citizens as regards the 
observance of rules, whereby government can be taken to say ‘these are the rules you 
should follow, and if you follow them you have the assurance’ that I will not sanction 
                                                        
7 This question, it is worth noting, has broad jurisprudential significance. Thus, for instance, it bears on 
the debate over the separability thesis (i.e. over whether there a necessary conceptual connection between 
law and morality, and, if so, what it is); and it also has bearing on issues such as law’s capacity to morally 
bind and to give reasons for action. As regards the separability thesis, see: Gardner (2012) pp 27, 48, 193-
4, 221-37; Simmonds (2007) pp 70-73; Simmonds (2010) pp 281-283; Green (2008). 
8 ‘[E]xcept perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said to be one kind of 
contract’ (ibid). 
9 Which is why Fuller also calls them the principles of legality. 
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you (ibid., 40). 10 ￼ This aspect of reciprocity ties in with a notion of fairness: a 
government that would sanction a citizen without there being any breach of rules on his 
or her part would thereby treat that citizen unfairly. In another key remark, Fuller links 
the eight requirements to respect for human agency and dignity. He notes that ‘the view 
of man implicit in’ those eight requirements is that of ‘a responsible agent capable of 
understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults’ (ibid., 162),￼ and 
that every departure from these requirements ‘is an affront to man’s dignity as a 
responsible agent’ (ibid).￼ As mentioned above, Fuller points out some further, indirect 
moral bearings of his eight requirements. He notes, for example, that acting by known 
rules is a prerequisite for any meaningful appraisal of the justice of law,11￼ both by the 
public (because minimum consistency, promulgation, clarity, etc., expose actions to 
public scrutiny—ibid., 158) and by the lawmaker herself (because people tend to be 
more answerable to their own conscience when they have to articulate to themselves 
what they do—ibid., 159). Thus, on Fuller’s view, although the eight requirements are 
about procedure rather than content, they create conditions conducive to the moral 
quality of the law’s content.  
The second, contrasting paradigm is most prominently reflected in the views of 
HLA Hart (1965) and Joseph Raz (2009). Hart, to begin with, accuses Fuller of 
conflating two different notions: morality and purposive activity (Hart, 1965: 1285-
1286). Fuller’s eight requirements of form, claims Hart, are principles for the efficient 
execution of a purposive activity—and a purposive activity can be morally good or 
morally bad, depending on the specific purpose pursued. An example furnished by Hart 
is poisoning—a purposive activity, whose purpose is to kill another being (ibid., 1286). 
Poisoning, Hart points out, also has ‘internal’ or ‘inner’ principles: for example, ‘Avoid 
using poisons which cause the victim to vomit’ or ‘Avoid using poisons if their shape, 
color, or size is likely to attract notice and alert the intended victim’ (ibid.). But we 
would not, of course, call these principles of the poisoner’s art ‘the morality of 
poisoning’. And this point, Hart maintains, extends to the context of law: since, for him, 
law can be a vehicle for either morally worthy or morally depraved ends, we should 
avoid the slip from talking about its inner principles of operation as a purposive practice 
to talking about its inner morality. 
Raz, too, put forward a number of important objections to the idea that the Rule 
of Law is a moral virtue. One of his objections builds upon, and partly echoes, Hart’s 
argument described in the previous paragraph. Conformity with the Rule-of-Law 
principles (e.g. promulgation, clarity, prospectivity, and consistency), Raz points out, is 
essential to law’s ability to guide conduct.12 It has, in other words, an instrumental 
significance, in the sense that it enables the law to effectively achieve the direct 
purposes it (Raz, 2009: 225-226) ￼ (hence, we will refer to this approach as ‘the 
instrumental conception’). But, like many other instruments, it can be utilised for good 
or ill purposes; namely, the substantive purposes law is able to secure by effectively 
                                                        
10 And he adds: ‘When this bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by government, 
nothing is left on which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe the rules’ (ibid). 
11 He notes further: ‘“A lawless unlimited power” expressing itself solely in unpredictable and pattern-
less intervention in human affairs could be said to be unjust only in the sense that it does not act by 
known rules’ (ibid., 157-158). 
12 And law’s conduct-guiding function, especially from the perspective of Raz’s authority-centred 
theory of law, is central to the idea of law. In particular, certain formal attributes essential for the 
capacity to guide conduct are, according to Raz, conceptually necessary for something to qualify as a 
law. 
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guiding conduct can be either morally good or morally bad (depending on the content of 
the law in question). That is why the Rule-of-Law should not be conceived of, 
according to Raz, as a moral virtue, though it is, in his view, a virtue of law. This last 
distinction—and, more generally, the notion that we can speak of some property as 
virtuous, but not morally virtuous—seems to comprise Raz’s primary supplement to the 
initial argument of Hart. Raz fleshes out this distinction through a non-legal example: 
the property of sharpness as it relates to knives. Sharpness is part of what makes a knife 
effective, but the knife can be used for either morally good purposes (say, to prepare 
food for a person in need) or for morally ill purposes (say, to murder a person). So, 
sharpness is not a moral virtue, but we can nonetheless say that a sharp knife is a good 
knife—which is to say that sharpness is a good-making characteristic of knives. It is a 
virtue of knives, but not a moral virtue. And, according to Raz, something analogous 
holds in the relationship between the Rule of Law and law: the Rule of Law is to law 
what the sharpness is to a knife—which is to say that the Rule of Law is a virtue of law, 
but not a moral virtue. 
Now, it bears emphasizing that the range of views and arguments on the moral 
status of the Rule of Law does not boil down to the above two paradigms of thought. In 
particular, the dialectic between these two paradigms ramifies into related and more 
nuanced debates, between other theorists, over questions such as: Is compliance with 
the Rule of Law equally serviceable to the pursuit of morally depraved and morally 
good substantive aims? If it is, does this actually show that the Rule of Law is morally 
neutral? And so on. We will not canvass here those further ramifications of the debate, 
and the contrasting views on each of them. For purposes of our analysis, the two 
principal paradigms of thought presented above provide sufficient background, which, 
we believe, can effectively bring out the distinctive character of our approach. 
 
3.2. Critical Assessment and an Alternative Proposal— 
The Hybrid Conception 
We turn to consider the two foregoing positions and put forward our own approach. The 
instrumental conception, as explained above, refuses to attach moral value to the 
procedure embodied in the Rule of Law—only the substantive goals attained through 
legal forms of conduct-guiding might (or might not) be morally valuable, from this 
perspective. This, we will argue, is an erroneous position. The procedural morality 
conception, on the other hand, ascribes to Rule-of-Law procedures moral value, which it 
views as entirely independent of the content of law. This, too, is erroneous in our view, 
as will be explained below. How can both these positions be mistaken at once? And, if 
they are, what is the correct position? There is, we suggest, a middle path between these 
two positions, which better captures the moral significance of the Rule of Law. This 
middle path emerges into view with the following, twofold recognition: a procedural 
attribute of law (‘PL’) can have a genuine capacity to contribute, in itself, to the moral 
value of law—in other words, PL can have a genuine moral-value-endowing quality; 
and yet, at the same time, the materialisation of that moral value—i.e. to what degree, or 
even whether at all, it materialises—may be partly sensitive to the law’s content and 
substantive ends.  
The twofold recognition just stated reflects a type of hybridity between 
procedural and substantive moral qualities (hence the label we will be using for our 
approach: ‘the hybrid conception’). The possibility of such a hybrid was initially 
indicated by the empirical analysis in Section II. It was observed there that, empirically 
speaking, each of the following factors makes a significant contribution to compliance: 
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(i) content-specific assessments of individual laws, and (ii) ascriptions of legitimacy to 
the legal system, which is itself predicted significantly by perceived procedural justice. 
But the analysis also revealed an interactive, and synergetic, dynamic between the 
above two factors, one aspect of this interaction being that higher levels of content-
specific moral approval make legitimacy—and, by implication, make perceived 
procedural justice—a better predictor of compliance than it otherwise is.13 When it 
comes to people’s attitudes towards law, then, procedural qualities of law hold genuine 
significance in their own right, and have genuine influence on people’s actions, but the 
extent of their influence is sensitive, at least partly, to people’s substantive assessments 
of the law’s content. This empirical picture prompts us to ask: Could it be the case that 
such procedure-substance hybridity is not only a feature of people’s common attitudes 
towards law, but also characterizes the actual moral significance of law’s procedural 
attributes? Is there a philosophical explanation that could vindicate this procedure-
substance hybridity, namely an explanation showing that it is part of the true moral 
significance of the Rule of Law? We believe there is such an explanation, and will 
outline it in the following paragraphs. 
The explanation starts with the moral value (or, at any rate, potentiality for 
moral value) attributable to Rule-of-Law procedures. In this regard, we believe that 
Fuller’s view, notwithstanding the oversights or errors it arguably suffers from, contains 
some true insights. Thus, for example, it seems to us cogent to say that adherence to the 
Rule of Law contributes to the moral quality of the relation between government and 
citizens by securing a type of reciprocity between them with regard to the observance of 
rules. And there seems to us to be a core of truth in the claim that Rule-of-Law 
observance expresses respect for human dignity at least as far as procedure is 
concerned, and that it implicitly envisions the subject as a responsible agent in terms of 
her engagement with rules and ability to plan her actions in response to them. So, too, 
we find much to agree with in subsequent elaborations or restatements of Fuller’s 
position by some of his proponents, such as Simmonds’ arguments about the Rule of 
Law’s contribution to liberty (in the specific sense of independence of the will of 
another; Simmonds, 2007: 99-103)14  or Rundle’s elucidation of the relation between 
legal form and human agency (Rundle, 2012).15 It is, perhaps, easy to lose sight of the 
kernel of truth in these positions when dealing with the topic with purely theoretical 
tools at a relative distance from its practical settings. But even a brief consideration of 
the practical experience of those at the receiving end of violations of the Rule of Law 
should suffice to appreciate the good sense contained in the foregoing views. Consider, 
for example, the position of a participant in a legally permissible demonstration who is 
nonetheless detained by the police and held in custody without having violated any 
previously declared rule (some reason is invoked— say, that he engaged in ‘disorderly 
behaviour’—but it is not traceable to any rule). Or, take the case of a business owner 
who is ordered by the authorities to close her business on pain of a failure to comply 
                                                        
13 An interaction in the opposite direction was also observed: namely, content-specific moral approval is 
a stronger predictor when legal legitimacy is higher. 
14 More particularly, Simmonds (2007: 101) explains that he refers to ‘liberty’ not in the sense of how 
wide one’s range of optional actions is—he acknowledges that rules, or at least mandatory rules, may 
restrict that range. Instead, he means ‘liberty’ in the sense that the limits of that range of actions are (at 
any given point in time) independent from the present will of another person. The Rule of Law 
contributes to our independence of the will of others because it prevents the ruler from exercising force 
outside the scope of rules laid down in advance: so what we are allowed or not allowed to do is 
determined by those rules, and not by the will, or whim, of the rulers at present. 
15 See comments on the above work in Gur (2014). 
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with regulations that were worded in a language too ambiguous to understand what they 
actually require. Would these individuals not be correct to think that the conditions 
enabling their agency have been prejudiced, and that their liberty (in the sense 
mentioned above) has been compromised? And, as far as expressive value is concerned, 
would individuals subjected to such treatment not be right to consider it an expression 
of disrespect for their agency and autonomy, and to feel an affront to their dignity? An 
affirmative answer to these questions seems to hold a compelling level of intuitive 
appeal.  
So, why not understand the value of the Rule of Law as a purely procedural 
value? What sort of substance-procedure interaction do we recognise, which leads us, 
instead, to adopt a hybrid understanding? One principal type of substance-procedure 
interaction revolves around the expressive significance of the Rule of Law. While 
adherence to Rule-of-Law standards is capable and apt to bear the expressive 
significance highlighted in the previous paragraph, its expressive effect, we suggest, 
partly depends for its materialization (or, at least, its full materialization) on contextual 
factors—and, as part of this, the degree to which it materializes is sensitive to the moral 
quality of the law’s content. This claim rests on a recognition that is hardly unique to 
the specific context of the Rule of Law. What we observe here, in other words, is a 
particular case of the general way in which actions derive their expressive significance: 
they acquire their expressive significance partly by  virtue of their own attributes, and 
from social conventions about their meaning, but their meaning and the message they 
convey are also sensitive to contextual factors (contextual factors which include, inter 
alia, other actions originating from the same source). 
 
3.3. Expressive Value, Contextual Factors, and the Rule of Law 
To substantiate the above claim, some general comments on the expressive force of 
actions are required. To start with, it is a conspicuous fact and a salient feature of our 
everyday life that many of our (non-verbal) actions carry expressive significance—that 
is, that they convey meanings. (Sunstein, 1996: 2021-2022). Moreover, it seems 
difficult to adequately capture the richness of our normative and moral lives without 
accepting that the expressive meaning of an action, in at least some instances, morally 
matters, and (on the flipside) that whether the action is morally desirable, right, 
virtuous, or not, may depend (at least in part) on its expressive meaning (in this or a 
similar vein, see, e.g., Pildes & Anderson, 1990; Nozick, 1993: 28-32; Anderson & 
Pildes, 2000; Khaitan, 2012: 4). It falls outside the scope of this chapter to provide a 
comprehensive account of the expressive significance of actions; we will thus largely 
operate within the framework of existing theories, and mostly confine our explanatory 
comments to what is directly material to our claim.  
One distinction worth noting at this point is between action whose entire point is 
expressive (e.g. gestures such as salutation, tipping one’s hat, bowing, shaking 
someone’s hand, or kissing the picture of a loved one) and action that has other, non-
expressive purpose (e.g. consisting in its physical or economic effect) but which also 
carries expressive meaning (e.g. physically assaulting another with the aim of causing 
them bodily harm normally also expresses disrespect for their dignity).16 In the interest 
of clarity, it seems to us warranted to reserve the label ‘expressive action’ for the former 
type, and to use a somewhat more inclusive language (e.g. ‘expressively-significant 
                                                        
16 Cf Wittgenstein’s (1993) distinction between instrumental or effective action on the one hand and 
ritualistic or expressive action on the other. 
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action’) when referring to the latter type or to both types. Now, typically, where actions 
hold expressive moral significance, what those actions manifest is an attitude—e.g., an 
attitude towards some person or persons, be it contempt, care, compassion, forgiveness, 
courtesy, or some other attitude. But this is not to say that expressive meaning is 
reducible simply to the actor’s (or indeed to any other person’s) subjective state of mind 
(Anderson & Pildes, 2000: 1512-1513, 1574). An action, to give one example, can be 
offensive even where the actor is oblivious to its offensive meaning or positively 
believes that it is not offensive (ibid., 1524). Although the actor’s subjective state of 
mind is morally relevant, regard must be had to other factors, whether for pragmatic or 
substantive reasons. Determinations of expressive meaning, as emphasized by several 
writers, are exercises of interpretation or construction that are at least partly guided or 
constrained by objective standards (Anderson & Pildes, 2000: 1512, 1525; Khaitan, 
2012: 9, 11-13). In some instances, such determinations will involve a relatively high 
measure of changeability according to local conventions and cultural codes—by way of 
example, subtly acting as though you have not noticed an acquaintance in the street in 
order not to be detained in a conversation might be socially acceptable in some cultures, 
but might come across as aloof and unsociable in other cultures.17￼ In other instances, 
however, it may be warranted for the attribution of expressive meaning to transcend, or 
break away from, specific social convention in response to less (or none-) contingent 
considerations—to borrow an example from Anderson and Pildes (2000), even when it 
was socially acceptable for ‘men in business settings to routinely compliment their 
female colleagues and subordinates on the way they looked’ there was nonetheless 
something insulting in that behaviour, in that it ‘amounted to treating women as if they 
were not serious workers, but merely sexual or aesthetic adornments in a business 
scene’ (ibid., 1524-1525). 
Especially pertinent to our argument is the following point. As is normally the 
case with exercises of interpretation, the attribution of expressive meaning to an action 
is sensitive to the context, and the context may include, inter alia, other actions 
originating from the same source. Context-sensitivity, to begin with, is a familiar and 
widely accepted feature of interpretation, certainly when it comes to the interpretation 
of verbal utterances, and there is no reason, it seems to us, to make an exception in this 
regard for the interpretation of non-verbal actions.18 Moreover, as a concomitant to the 
preceding point, contextual factors may bear on the attribution of moral significance to 
both verbal utterances and expressive actions. Suppose, for example, a speaker (Jessica) 
starts a statement with the words ‘With all due respect to X …’, but the rest of the 
statement is, in content and/or style, disrespectful to X. Should this not reflect on the 
expressive meaning and significance we are ready to assign Jessica’s words ‘With all 
due respect’, perhaps inclining us to construe them as words of irony rather than an 
actual expression of respect? And should we not say something similar (mutatis 
mutandis) when the case involves, instead of an utterance, an expressive gesture—as, 
for example, when James shakes hands with George or smiles to him, but all other 
actions he performs before and after that gesture are invariably unfriendly to George? It 
seems to us highly cogent to think the full view of James’ behaviour towards George 
detracts from, or undermines, the expressive significance his gesture could otherwise 
have, or even imbues it with the negative quality of a formal device used to disguise an 
                                                        
17 For another example to a similar effect, see Sunstein (1996: 2022). 
18 Indeed, it is arguable that the role of context in the interpretation of non-verbal expression is often 
greater than it is regarding verbal expression because non-verbal means of expression are often more 
ambiguous than verbal ones. 
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improper attitude. Or, further consider Mark’s actions of holding the door open for his 
companion or placing a hand on the companion’s shoulder during their conversation. 
Are his actions courteous and friendly or are they patronizing? The answer may be 
sensitive, inter alia, to whether the general context of their relationship involves actions 
of domination and superiority, or instead respect between equals. Or, consider finally 
Martin’s act of supplying food and water for the sustenance of a certain group of 
people. Does the action express care and compassion? That, too, depends on contextual 
factors, such as whether that group consists of destitute homeless people or is, in fact, a 
group of hostages held by Martin, which he keeps alive for the sole purpose of 
obtaining ransom. 
Actions by legal authority, which are the type of action we are interested in here, 
are not an exception to the above point: the expressive significance of such actions, or 
of any given aspect thereof (e.g. its procedure or its substance), is also sensitive to 
context. As Hellman put it in an article discussing the expressive meaning of 
government action through the prism of the Equal Protection Clause, ‘understanding 
their meaning [is] an inherently contextual task’ (Hellman, (2000: 29). And the context, 
it should be stressed, may include not only its (non-legal) factual backdrop, but also 
related actions of the same institution or related aspects of its operation. Consider, first, 
an example illustrating the context-sensitivity of expressive meaning within law: In the 
case of County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989), the US Supreme Court 
considered whether two displays of religious symbols on public property in Pittsburgh 
amounted to endorsements of religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause.19￼ Justice Blackmun for the Court made the following remark on 
how the test should be applied: ‘the government’s use of religious symbolism is 
unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the 
government’s use of religious symbolism depends upon its context (ibid., 597).’ 
Applying this test, Blackmun ruled that in one of the displays, which set a Hanukkah 
menorah next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, the settings neutralized any 
message of endorsement of Judaism that might otherwise be conveyed by a menorah, 
whereas in the second display, where a crèche was displayed alone, the crèche retained 
its religious meaning.  
Contextual factors do not cease to be relevant when the law’s expressive 
significance is analysed from a moral standpoint. Thus, when we consider the 
expressive moral significance of the law’s procedural or formal mode of operation, the 
relevant context may encompass, inter alia, the law’s substance or content. Suppose, for 
example, your legal system limits its impositions on you to the confines of previously 
declared rules—a procedural mode of operation that can normally be regarded as an 
expression of respect for your dignity—but the content of its rules expresses the 
opposite attitude, disrespect for your dignity, in that it oppresses you or wrongly 
discriminates against you. The content of its rules, on our approach, detracts from the 
message of respect its procedures could otherwise convey—it takes away from its 
credibility as an expression of a genuine attitude of respect. Indeed, it is not 
unreasonable to suspect that a government of this sort conforms to the Rule of Law not 
out of respect for its citizens, but in order to mask its iniquitous agenda with a mantle of 
legitimacy, and thereby lower people’s moral guard and avoid civil resistance—a 
strategy involving a form of manipulation that actually signifies an attitude of disrespect 
for citizens’ autonomy, agency, and dignity. And, in a similar vein, such substance-
                                                        
19 See relevant discussion in Hellman (2000: esp 25-26) and Anderson & Pildes (2000: 1545-1551) 
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procedure hybridity can manifest itself in positive terms too: namely, when the Rule-of-
Law is adhered to in a context where government also shows respect for citizens by 
adopting morally appropriate substantive policies into its laws, the expressive value of 
Rule-of-Law adherence is likely to materialize and flourish to its fullest potential. 
Finally, how do we perceive the relationship between our argument and 
relational theory of procedural justice? We believe that our argument dovetails well 
with relational theory of procedural justice, even if it is not strictly dependent on it or 
exclusively bound up with it. A few words of explanation are required. Relational 
theory of procedural justice (in its normative variety propounded by Meyerson & 
Mackenzie (2018)) locates the value of procedural justice in ‘the message of social 
inclusion and equality sent by satisfactory interpersonal interactions with authorities’ 
(ibid., 7), and its positive contribution to individuals’ sense of self-respect and self-
worth. The evaluative focus of this approach is neither the community per se nor a 
socially atomistic notion of the individual, but rather the individual as a social creature 
whose identity ‘is constituted through interpersonal relationships and in the context of 
the broader social and political environments’ in which he or she lives (ibid., 6). Now, 
by way of relating this outlook to our own argument, we want to highlight in particular 
two aspects of their compatibility. First, like our own argument, the relational 
conception of procedural justice contains reference to, and implicit recognition of, the 
expressive significance of actions. Thus, for instance, the relational conception of 
procedural value adverts to the ‘message of social inclusion and equality sent by 
satisfactory interpersonal interactions with authorities’, noting that satisfactory 
treatment by group authorities ‘symbolically communicates the information that we 
possess value or status in the eyes of our community’ (ibid., 7, emphases added). Such 
expressive attributes tentatively suggest that the relational conception of procedural 
justice may even be subsumed as a specific variety of expressive theories of value. 
Second, a relational outlook seems to us particularly auspicious to our argument, or at 
any rate to one crucial element of our line of reasoning—namely, our emphasis on 
context-sensitivity in the attribution of expressive significance to actions. This is so for 
the following reason. The very idea of a social or interpersonal relationship implies an 
enduring connection and association between the relevant parties that extend beyond a 
mere one-off interaction, and it is only plausible that this sort of relational backdrop 
would also reflect on the expressive significance attached to actions done in a 
relationship. Thus, especially in the context of a relationship—be it a relationship 
between friends, spouses, employer-employee, or government-citizen—it seems 
appropriate to attach expressive significance to various actions not in complete 
insolation from one another, but with a more holistic view of the relationship and of 
certain other actions performed in it. This notion is highly consonant with our claim that 
the expressive significance of legal procedure is sensitive to its context, and to the law’s 
content as part of that context. To couch an example borrowing the terminology of 
relational theory, ‘the message of social inclusion and equality’ sent by adherence to 
due procedures will be, ceteris paribus, far less full-blooded and far more faint (if not 
completely obliterated) where the associated laws have, say, racially segregating or 
gender discriminatory content than where those laws have just and equitable content. In 
sum, then, although our line of reasoning has not been developed in terms confined to 
relational theory, a relational outlook, we believe, strikes up a particularly harmonious 
tone with our argument. 
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4. Conclusion 
This collaborative work initially put forward a number of empirical claims regarding 
law-related attitudes and predictors of compliance, which, in turn, inspired a fresh 
engagement with the legal-philosophical question of the moral status of the Rule of 
Law.  
At the empirical level, then, it was observed that (perceived) procedural qualities 
of law hold genuine significance in their own right, and have genuine influence on 
people’s actions, but the extent of their influence is sensitive, at least partly, to people’s 
substantive assessments of the law’s content. This empirical picture prompted us, in 
Section 3, to ask the following question, with a particular focus on the Rule of Law’s 
moral status: Is there a philosophical counterpart of the above interactive phenomenon, 
in the sense that procedure-substance interaction is not only a feature of people’s 
attitudes towards law, but is also a feature of the actual moral significance of the Rule of 
Law? We proposed an affirmative answer, advocating a hybrid procedural-substantive 
conception of the value of the Rule of Law. We put forward this conception as an 
alternative to two rival paradigms in the jurisprudential discourse—the first of which 
(‘the procedural morality conception’, as we referred to it) claims that Fuller’s eight 
precepts of legality embody a moral virtue not contingent on the law’s content, while 
the second (‘the instrumental conception’, as we called it) claims that Fuller’s precepts 
are merely principles for the efficient execution of law’s substantive goals (whether 
morally good or bad), and thus have no independent moral value. In contrast, on the 
view propounded here, Fuller’s principles possess an expressive quality, but their 
expressive effect does not materialize in isolation from other, contextual factors—and, 
in particular, the extent to which it materializes is partly sensitive to the moral quality of 
law’s content.  
The line of reasoning we offered in support of this hybrid conception contains 
two main limbs: On the one hand, we agreed with Fuller and some of his proponents 
that the Rule of Law tends to promote or express respect for human dignity, liberty, and 
agency, in some of the ways they have identified. We thus acknowledged that Rule-of-
Law compliance has, in itself, a genuine capacity to contribute moral value to modes of 
governance—that it has, in itself, a moral-value-endowing quality. On the other hand, 
we argued that the expressive effect of Rule-of-Law adherence (which is one aspect of 
the moral quality just mentioned) nonetheless partly depends for its materialisation on 
contextual factors—and, as part of this, the degree to which it materialises is sensitive to 
the moral quality of the law’s content. This, we suggested, is a particular case of the 
general way in which actions derive their expressive significance: they acquire their 
expressive significance partly by  virtue of their own attributes, and from social 
convention about their meaning, but their meaning and conveyed message are also 
sensitive to contextual factors (including other actions originating from the same source 
in the same context). Thus, if a given government action is such that it normally 
expresses respect for your dignity (e.g., limiting its impositions on you to a set of 
previously declared rules), but other related actions of that government are such that 
they clearly express the opposite attitude, i.e. disrespect for your dignity (e.g., 
subjecting you to rules whose content oppresses you or wrongly discriminates against 
you), then the latter contaminates the message of the former, detracts from it, or takes 
away from its credibility as an expression of a genuine attitude of respect. And, vice 
versa, when the Rule-of-Law is adhered to in a context where government also shows 
respect for citizens by adopting morally appropriate substantive policies into its laws, 
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the expressive value of Rule-of-Law adherence is likely to materialize and flourish to its 
fullest potential.  
Our hybrid conception, we finally suggested, harmonises well with ‘relational 
theory of procedural justice’, specifically in its recently developed normative variety 
(even if our conception is not strictly dependent on that theory). This is so not only 
because, like our hybrid conception, relational theory of procedural justice makes focal 
reference to the expressive significance of actions, but also because a relational outlook, 
as we see it, is particularly auspicious to our argument about context-sensitivity: 
especially within a relationship—be it a relationship between spouses, friends, 
employer-employee, or government-citizen—it seems appropriate to attach expressive 
significance to various actions not in complete isolation from one another, but with a 
more holistic view of the relationship and of certain other actions performed in it. We 
believe, therefore, that the hybrid conception advanced here dovetails well and readily 
chimes in with a relational outlook. 
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